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Answering Halliburton II’s Unanswered
Question: Burdens of Production and
Persuasion on Price Impact at Class
Certication
By Wendy Gerwick Couture*
I.

Introduction

In the Supreme Court's 2014 ruling in Halliburton Co. v. Erica
P. John Fund, Inc. (“Halliburton II”),1 the Court held that a
defendant can rebut the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance at class certication by showing the absence of price impact.
Left unanswered by the Court is the allocation of the burdens of
production and persuasion with respect to price impact at class
certication. This Essay seeks to answer this question, drawing
from the Court's guidance in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes2 and
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend3 on the merits inquiry required at
class certication and Federal Rule of Evidence 301's guidance on
the allocation of burdens of production and persuasion with respect to presumptions. Ultimately, this Essay proposes a step-bystep analytical pathway to guide courts and litigants as they
engage in a merits inquiry about price impact at the class certication stage.
This Essay proceeds in six additional parts. Part II reviews the
Halliburton II ruling, demonstrating that the allocation of
burdens of production and persuasion on price impact at class
certication is left unanswered and explaining why this allocation is potentially outcome-determinative. Part III discusses the
Supreme Court's guidance in Wal-Mart and Comcast on the
merits inquiry required at class certication, arguing therefrom
that district courts should certify a class unless no reasonable
jury could nd price impact. Part IV examines Federal Rule of
Evidence 301, arguing that Rule 301's allocation of burdens of
production and persuasion should guide district courts' determination of whether a reasonable jury could nd price impact. Part
V presents this Essay's recommendation as a step-by-step analytical pathway. Part VI compares this Essay's recommendation to
the case law on price impact, demonstrating that it is consistent
*Wendy Gerwick Couture is an Associate Professor at the University of
Idaho College of Law, where she teaches securities regulation and white collar
crime.
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with some courts' treatment of price impact and inconsistent
with the pre-Halliburton II case law in the Second Circuit.
Finally, Part VII briey concludes, posing some additional questions left unanswered by Halliburton II.
II. Halliburton II’s Unanswered Question
Reliance is an element of a private cause of action for securities fraud under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act4 and Rule
10b-55 promulgated thereunder.6 If the members of a plainti
class had to show individualized reliance on a defendant's alleged
misrepresentations, the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)
class certication requirement that “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions aecting
only individual members”7 would fail.8
There is another way to show reliance, however, which is common to the class as a whole and which allows common questions
to predominate over individual ones: by showing that the
defendant committed a “fraud on the market.” This way of showing reliance, rst recognized by the Supreme Court in Basic Inc.
v. Levinson,9 has two essential components. First, an alleged misrepresentation has a price impact because material “public information generally aects stock prices.”10 Second, most investors
who purchase at the market price do so in reliance on the integrity of market price,11 thus indirectly relying on the alleged misrepresentation itself (which impacted the market price).12
A plainti can show the two components of “fraud on the market” reliance by invoking presumptions. In order to invoke a
presumption of the rst component (price impact), the plainti
must establish the following two prerequisites by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that the alleged material misrepresentation was publicly disseminated; and (2) that the market was
ecient. 13 In order to invoke a presumption of the second
component (purchase in reliance on the integrity of the market
price), a plainti must show that investors “purchased the stock
at the market price during the relevant period.”14 At class certication, a defendant can prevent the invocation of these presumptions by demonstrating that the plainti has failed to meet its
burden of establishing these prerequisites (with the exception of
materiality15).
Once invoked, the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance
is rebuttable. In Basic, the Court acknowledged that each
component of the presumption is rebuttable at the merits stage.
For example, during the merits stage of the case, defendants
could rebut the rst component—price impact—by showing “that
the ‘market makers’ were privy to the truth . . . and thus that
the market price would not have been aected by their
168
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misrepresentations.” 1 6 Likewise, during the merits stage,
defendants could rebut the second component—investors' reliance on the integrity of the market price—by showing that a
plainti believed the alleged misrepresentations to be false and
nonetheless purchased or sold the securities “because of other unrelated concerns, e.g., potential antitrust problems, or political
pressures.”17 In Halliburton II, the Court held that the rst
component of the presumption—price impact—can also be rebutted at the class certication stage; a defendant need not wait
until the merits stage of the case to rebut price impact.18 The
Court explained that price impact is “Basic’s fundamental
premise” and that “[i]t thus has everything to do with predominance at the class certication stage.”19 Thus, after Halliburton
II, “[d]efendants may seek to defeat the Basic presumption at
that [class certication] stage through direct as well as indirect
price impact evidence.”20
The open question after Halliburton II is the allocation of
burdens of production and persuasion on price impact at class
certication.21 Somewhat naively, the Majority Opinion appears
to view price impact as binary: either price impact exists or it
does not, and the district court can just look at “the evidence” at
class certication and discern whether it exists. Here are the Majority Opinion's statements about price impact evidence at class
certication, with emphasis added:
E Halliburton contends that defendants should at least be allowed to defeat the presumption at the class certication
stage through evidence that the misrepresentation did not in
fact aect the stock price. We agree.22
E Suppose a defendant at the certication stage submits an
event study looking at the impact on the price of its stock
from six discrete events, in an eort to refute the plaintis'
claim of general market eciency. All agree the defendant
may do this. Suppose one of the six events is the specic
misrepresentation asserted by the plaintis. All agree that
this too is perfectly acceptable. Now suppose the district
court determines that, despite the defendant's study, the
plainti has carried its burden to prove market eciency,
but that the evidence shows no price impact with respect to
the specic misrepresentation challenged in the suit. The evidence at the certication stage thus shows an ecient market, on which the alleged misrepresentation had no price
impact. And yet under EPJ Fund's view, the plaintis' action should be certied and proceed as a class action (with
all that entails), even though the fraud-on-the-market theory does not apply and common reliance thus cannot be
presumed. Such a result is inconsistent with Basic’s own
© 2015 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Summer 2015
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logic.23
E Price impact is thus an essential precondition for any Rule
10b-5 class action. While Basic allows plaintis to establish
that precondition indirectly, it does not require courts to
ignore a defendant's direct, more salient evidence showing
that the alleged misrepresentation did not actually aect the
stock's market price and, consequently, that the Basic
presumption does not apply.24
E [D]efendants must be aorded an opportunity before class
certication to defeat the presumption through evidence that
an alleged misrepresentation did not actually aect the market price of the stock.25
In reality, however, price impact is a fact question like any
other. Professor John C. Coee, Jr. gave the following example of
how the district court at class certication might be faced with
competing evidence on price impact:
Suppose then that, at the class certication hearing, defendants
show that on the corrective disclosure the market declined, but the
response was signicant only at the 90% level of condence (and
not the conventional 95% level). Have defendants met their burden
when they actually show that there was a 90% chance of price
distortion? Plaintis may further respond that the market also
declined the prior week when a prominent securities analyst
predicted that the company would make a corrective disclosure
indicating that it had earlier overstated (but again the market's response was below the 95% level of condence). Plaintis will argue
that the information leaked out (or was deliberately disseminated)
in multiple steps to minimize its impact, but defendants will respond that they have shown that plaintis cannot ultimately prove
loss causation. Who wins? Statisticians and proceduralists may disagree here as to what the court's response should be.26

Indeed, Justice Ginsburg's Halliburton II concurrence, joined by
Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, seems to have anticipated this
problem: “But the Court recognizes that it is incumbent upon the
defendant to show the absence of price impact. The Court's judgment, therefore, should impose no heavy toll on securities-fraud
plaintis with tenable claims.”27 Even this statement, however,
leaves open the standard by which the defendants must make a
showing of absence of price impact in order to defeat class
certication. As with any fact question, the burdens of production
and persuasion with respect to price impact will often be outcomedeterminative, and post-Halliburton II the district courts must
struggle with this question without guidance from the Supreme
Court.
In response, this Essay seeks to provide guidance on the
burdens of production and persuasion on price impact at class
certication. This question involves the intersecting issues of (1)
170
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the plainti's burden of proof on the merits at class certication;
and (2) the eect of a presumption about the merits on burdens
of proof and persuasion. This Essay addresses each issue in turn
and then makes a recommendation that integrates them into one
analytical framework.
III. The Plainti's Burden of Proof on the Merits at Class
Certication
As the Supreme Court recently claried in Wal-Mart and Comcast, a plainti has the burden of proving the Rule 23 prerequisites of class certication, including commonality (at issue in
Wal-Mart) and predominance (at issue in Comcast).28 Ordinarily,
the merits of the plainti's case—i.e., whether the plainti will
win or lose—should be reserved for the merits stage of the case
and not addressed at class certication.29 Sometimes, however, a
component of the merits of the plainti's case and the prerequisites of class certication are intertwined because, if the plainti
is unable to prove that component at the merits stage, the Rule
23 requirements of commonality or predominance will likewise
fail.30 For example, in Wal-Mart, the plaintis attempted to certify
a class consisting of current and former female employees of WalMart, alleging that Wal-Mart's policy of aording local managers
discretion over pay and promotions led to an unlawful disparate
impact on female employees.31 The merits of the disparate impact
claim were relevant at class certication because, “[w]ithout some
glue holding the alleged reasons for all those [employment] decisions together, it will be impossible to say that examination of all
the class members' claims for relief will produce a common
answer to the crucial question why was I disfavored.”32 Likewise,
in Comcast, the plaintis attempted to certify a class consisting
of subscribers to Comcast's cable-television services, alleging that
Comcast and its subsidiaries had violated the Sherman Act, thus
reducing the level of competition from “overbuilders” and causing
the plaintis damages.33 The merits of the plaintis' damages
claim were relevant at class certication because, absent a model
“establishing that damages are capable of measurement on a
classwide basis,” the predominance element would fail.34
Applying this standard to a securities fraud class action, only
those components of the merits of a securities fraud claim that
are intertwined with the predominance requirement are relevant
at class certication. For this reason, as the Court held Amgen
Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, materiality
is not relevant at class certication because the failure of
materiality would not destroy the predominance requirement.35
Rather, if the materiality element ultimately fails on the merits,
the case would be still be resolved classwide, just for the
defendant.36 Price impact, on the other hand, as the Court held in
© 2015 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Summer 2015
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Halliburton II, is relevant to class certication because—absent
price impact—the class will splinter, with individual suits able to
proceed with individualized showings of reliance but classwide
resolution pursuant to the “fraud on the market” showing of reliance rendered impossible.37
If a component of the merits of the plainti's case is relevant at
class certication because it is intertwined with the commonality
or predominance requirements, the next question is how strong
the plainti's merits showing must be at class certication in order to satisfy the commonality and predominance requirements.
This merits showing is one step removed from the Rule 23
showing.38 In Professor George Rutherglen's words: “It follows
that the plainti must present some evidence on the merits in order to demonstrate compliance with Rule 23 when the issues
overlap. The crucial question is: how much evidence?”39 The
Circuits are split on this question. For example, the Third Circuit
requires plaintis to prove merits intertwined with Rule 23
prerequisites by a “preponderance of the evidence,”40 while the
Sixth Circuit merely requires a “rigorous analysis” of the merits.41
Here, Wal-Mart and Comcast likewise provide guidance: the
relevant component of the plainti's merits case must be “capable
of” classwide resolution.42 Citing Professor Richard A. Nagareda,
the Court explained that the central question as applied to the
merits is “the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.”43
In neither opinion did the Court equate its “capable of” test
with a “preponderance of the evidence” standard. Rather, this
“capable of” test is comparable to the tests applied to the merits
when a defendant moves for summary judgment44 or judgment as
a matter of law,45 whereby a court determines “whether the evidence presents a sucient disagreement to require submission to
a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail
as a matter of law.”46 Indeed, the Court's application of the
“capable of” test in Wal-Mart and Comcast mimics the analysis
when a court rules on a defendant's motion for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law. In Wal-Mart, the Court
considered whether the plaintis were “capable of” proving
disparate impact, which was necessary to establish the Rule 23
requirement of commonality. The Court reviewed whether there
was evidence of a general policy of discrimination, nding that it
was “entirely absent here.”47 The Court examined the plaintis'
expert testimony and found that it “does nothing to advance
respondents' case.” 48 The Court also reviewed whether the
plaintis' statistical and anecdotal evidence showed a common
mode of exercising discretion, nding that “their evidence falls
well short.”49 The Court found that the studies were “insucient
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to establish that respondents' theory can be proved on a classwide
basis” because of a “failure of inference.”50 Likewise, the anecdotal
evidence was “too weak to raise any inference that all the individual, discretionary personnel decisions are discriminatory.”51 In
summary, the Court found that the plaintis had provided “no
convincing proof of a companywide discriminatory pay and promotion policy.”52 In Comcast, the Court considered whether the
plaintis were “capable of” establishing damages attributable to
the overbuilder theory, which was necessary to establish the Rule
23 requirement of predominance. The Court examined the
plaintis' damages model, nding that “it does not even attempt”
to “measure only those damages attributable to that theory.”53
The Court stated that “[t]here is no question that the model failed
to measure damages resulting from the particular antitrust injury
on which petitioners' liability in this action is premised.”54 The
Court also noted “the model's inability to bridge the dierences
between supra-competitive prices attributable in general and
supra-competitive prices attributable to the deterrence of
overbuilding.”55
Several scholars, including Professor Robert H. Klono and
Professor Rutherglen, agree that, when a component of the merits
case is intertwined with the Rule 23 prerequisites, the court
should certify the class if the plainti presents sucient evidence
of that component to withstand a defendant's motion for summary judgment.56 First, if a court applied a higher evidentiary
standard to the merits, such as a preponderance of the evidence
standard, the court would usurp the role of the fact nder,57
potentially in violation of the Seventh Amendment.58 In addition,
applying a higher evidentiary standard to merits questions at
class certication would create the potential for conicting rulings on motions for class certication and motions for summary
judgment, disrupting the ow of the case.59 Applying the same evidentiary standard to the merits at class certication and at summary judgment shows proper deference to the role of the fact
nder and prevents the possibility of inconsistent rulings.
Applying Wal-Mart and Comcast’s “capable of” test to the element of price impact at class certication, therefore, the district
court should determine if the plaintis are “capable of” establishing price impact. This inquiry should mimic the court's inquiry
when ruling on a defendant's motion for summary judgment or
judgment as a matter of law.60 In short, if there is a genuine
dispute as to price impact because a reasonable jury would have
a legally sucient evidentiary basis to nd price impact,61 the
court should certify the class because the plainti has shown “the
capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers.”62
On the other hand, if there is no genuine dispute as to price
© 2015 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Summer 2015
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impact because a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufcient evidentiary basis to nd price impact,63 the court should
not certify the class because a classwide proceeding does not have
the “capacity” to generate common answers.
Before applying this standard to price impact at class certication, however, a court must determine the eect of the fraud-onthe-market presumption and rebuttal evidence on whether a reasonable jury would have a legally sucient evidentiary basis to
nd price impact. In other words, once the plainti has invoked
the presumption, when does a defendant's rebuttal evidence
prevent a reasonable jury from nding price impact, such that
class certication should be denied? It is to that question that
this Essay now turns, guided by Federal Rule of Evidence 301.
IV. Federal Rule of Evidence 301's Burdens of Production and Persuasion
Federal Rule of Evidence 301 provides the following guidance
about the burdens of production and persuasion with respect to
presumptions in civil cases:
In a civil case, unless a federal statute or these rules provide
otherwise, the party against whom a presumption is directed has
the burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption. But
this rule does not shift the burden of persuasion, which remains on
the party who had it originally.64

Federal Rule of Evidence 101 denes a “civil case” as “a civil action or proceeding.”65
The preliminary question is whether Rule 301 applies to class
certication determinations of price impact in securities fraud
cases. The Supreme Court has not explicitly adopted Rule 301 for
purposes of the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance. The
Court in Basic cited Rule 301 for the proposition that “presumptions are useful devices for allocating the burdens of proof between parties,”66 but the Court did not state that Rule 301 applies to the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance. Despite
the parties' extensive citation to Rule 301 in their brieng in
Halliburton II,67 the Court in Halliburton II did not mention Rule
301 in its opinion.68 There are several possible explanations for
this omission. Perhaps the Court was not able to reach consensus
on the burdens of production and persuasion and thus left this
question unanswered, to be developed by the lower courts. Justice
Ginsburg's brief concurrence on the issue of burdens of production and persuasion suggests that there were indeed behind-thescenes discussions among the Justices about how these burdens
would play out at class certication.69 Or perhaps the Court
recognized that explicitly stating that Rule 301 applies at class
certication would appear to answer by implication another
174
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unanswered question—whether the standards for expert admissibility under Federal Rule of Evidence 70270 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.71 apply in class certication proceedings,72 and the Court did not want to resolve this hotly
debated issue via the back door. Regardless of the Court's rationale, however, the lower courts are left to determine whether
Rule 301 applies to price impact at class certication, and if so,
the import thereof.
By its terms, Rule 301 applies to “a civil action or proceeding,”
which encompasses class certication hearings, and the two arguments that Rule 301 should not apply to the presumption of price
impact at class certication are unconvincing. First, arguably,
the Federal Rules of Evidence in toto do not apply at class certication hearings. In support of this argument, the Supreme Court
in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, when rejecting an inquiry into
the merits of the plainti's case at class certication, stated the
following in dicta:
Additionally, we might note that a preliminary determination of
the merits may result in substantial prejudice to a defendant, since
of necessity it is not accompanied by the traditional rules and
procedures applicable to civil trials. The court's tentative ndings,
made in the absence of established safeguards, may color the
subsequent proceedings and place an unfair burden on the
defendant.73

As claried in Wal-Mart and Comcast, however, despite Eisen’s
broad rejection of an inquiry into the merits at class certication,
a merits inquiry is required at class certication when the merits
intersect with the Rule 23 requirements of commonality or
predominance.74 Therefore, in order to prevent the danger of prejudice that the Eisen Court foresaw, the rules of procedure and
evidence should apply at the class certication stage, at least to
the extent that there is an inquiry into the merits. Moreover, as
discussed above, the merits inquiry at class certication should
dovetail with the merits inquiry on motions for summary judgment and motions for judgment as a matter of law, to which Rule
301 applies.75 If Rule 301 did not apply at class certication,
there would be a disconnect between the rulings at class certication and at summary judgment, which would undercut the
purpose of the merits inquiry at class certication.76
Second, arguably, because the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance is an interpretation of § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act, a federal statute “provide[s] otherwise,” rendering
Rule 301 inapplicable.77 This argument is unconvincing because
the fraud-on-the-market presumption is a “judicially created doctrine designed to implement a judicially created cause of action,”78
rather than a presumption created by statute. Not surprisingly,
© 2015 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Summer 2015
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then, § 10(b) is silent about the burdens of production and persuasion with respect to the presumption of reliance and thus fails to
provide for an eect other than that specied by Rule 301.79 Moreover, the Court has explicitly applied Rule 301 to another
judicially created presumption, where the statute failed to mention the presumption or its eect. In particular, the Court has applied Rule 301 to the McDonnell Douglas framework, which is a
judicially created doctrine to implement a claim for discriminatory treatment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.80
Therefore, because neither argument against the applicability of
Rule 301 at class certication is convincing, courts should look to
Rule 301 for guidance on the burdens of production and persuasion on price impact at class certication.
In particular, because the inquiry into the merits at class certication mimics an inquiry into the merits in response to a
defendant's motion for summary judgment or for judgment as a
matter of law,81 Rule 301's dictates about the burdens of production and persuasion at those stages of the case should guide
courts when determining whether to grant class certication. If
under Rule 301's allocation of burdens of production and persuasion, a defendant's motion for summary judgment or judgment as
a matter of law on price impact should be denied, the court should
certify the class. If, on the other hand, under Rule 301's allocation of burdens, a defendant's motion for summary judgment or
judgment as a matter of law on price impact should be granted,
the court should not certify the class.
Rule 301 envisions two scenarios with respect to a defendant's
motion for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law on
a presumed element of the plainti's case. Under the rst scenario, the plainti establishes the basis facts to invoke the
presumption of the element, and the defendant does not oer any
rebuttal evidence. Under the second (and more dicult) scenario,
the plainti establishes the basic facts to invoke the presumption
of the element, and the defendant oers rebuttal evidence of the
non-existence of the element. This Essay analyzes each scenario,
guided by Rule 301 and the Court's application of Rule 301 to the
McDonnell Douglas framework, and applies the resultant guidance to the price impact inquiry at class certication.
Under the rst scenario, the plainti establishes the basic facts
to invoke the presumption of the element, and the defendant
does not oer any rebuttal evidence. Under Rule 301, a plainti
has a legally sucient basis for a reasonable jury to nd the existence of the element.82 Therefore, a defendant's motion for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law with respect to
that element should be denied.83 (Indeed, under this scenario, if
the trier of fact found the existence of the basic facts, the plainti
176
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would be entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to
that element.84).
The Court has exemplied Rule 301's treatment of this rst
scenario in the context of the McDonnell Douglas framework,
which the Court developed to determine whether a plainti has
proved the element of intentional discrimination under Title VII.
Under the rst step of this framework, as applied to alleged racial
discrimination, if the plainti establishes the prima facie case “(i)
that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied for and
was qualied for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualication, he was rejected; and
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of the
complainant's qualication,” then the plainti is entitled to a
presumption of intentional discrimination.85 As explained by the
Court, “[i]f the trier of fact believes the plainti's evidence, and if
the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court
must enter judgment for the plainti because no issue of fact
remains in the case.”86 This is consistent with how Rule 301 treats
this rst scenario.87
Applying this rst scenario to price impact, if the plainti
establishes the basic facts to invoke the presumption of price
impact (i.e., public dissemination and market eciency), the
plainti has a legally sucient basis for a reasonable jury to nd
price impact. Therefore, if the plainti invokes the presumption
and the defendant oers no rebuttal evidence, the class should be
certied. This is consistent with long-established practice, afrmed in Halliburton II.88
Under the second scenario, the plainti establishes the basic
facts to invoke the presumption of the element, and the defendant
oers rebuttal evidence of the non-existence of the element.
Under Rule 301, if the defendant's rebuttal evidence is not strong
enough that a reasonable jury could nd the non-existence of the
element, the presumption remains unrebutted.89 If, however, the
defendant's rebuttal evidence is strong enough that a reasonable
jury could nd the non-existence of the element, the presumption
disappears.90 Then, the inquiry becomes whether a reasonable
jury, looking at all of the evidence, could nonetheless nd the existence of the element. Although the presumption itself disappears, the jury may still consider the basic facts that gave rise to
the presumption and make natural inferences therefrom.91 Summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law should be granted
only if, considering all of the evidence, a reasonable jury could
not nd the existence of the element.92 When making this determination, the court should consider (1) the natural inferences
from the basic facts that gave rise to the now-disappeared
© 2015 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Summer 2015
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presumption; (2) the defendant's evidence of the non-existence of
this element; (3) any reasons to nd the defendant's evidence
unconvincing; and (4) any additional evidence of the element offered by the plainti.
The Court has also exemplied Rule 301's treatment of this
second scenario in the context of the McDonnell Douglas
framework. As explained by the Court, the defendant meets its
burden of rebutting the presumption of intentional discrimination “if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as
to whether it discriminated against the plainti.”93 To meet this
burden, the defendant must “clearly set forth, through the
introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plainti's
rejection.”94 If the defendant fails to meet this burden, the court
must enter judgment for the plainti as a matter of law.95 If the
defendant meets this burden, however, the presumption
disappears.96 If the presumption disappears, in order to prevent
summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law, a plainti
must show that a rational factnder could conclude that the action was intentionally discriminatory. 97 When considering
whether the plainti has met this burden, the court should
consider the natural inferences that arise from the plainti's
establishment of the prima facie case,98 the defendant's evidence
of the non-discriminatory reason for the employer's action, any
evidence that the defendant's proered reason is pretextual, and
any additional evidence of intentional discrimination by the
defendant.99 The plainti need not produce any additional evidence to meet this burden if the elements of the prima facie case,
coupled with the factnder's disbelief of the reasons put forward
by the defendant, would permit the trier of fact to infer the
ultimate fact of intentional discrimination.100
Applying this second scenario to price impact, the rst question
is whether the defendant on rebuttal has produced sucient evidence that a reasonable jury could nd the absence of price
impact. If not, the presumption remains unrebutted, and the
court should certify the class. If so, the presumption of price
impact disappears. If the presumption of price impact disappears,
the Court must then consider whether, looking at all of the evidence, a reasonable jury could nd the existence of price impact.
When making this determination, the court should consider (1)
the natural inferences about price impact arising from the public
dissemination of the alleged misrepresentation into an ecient
market; (2) the defendant's evidence of the lack of price impact;
(3) any reasons to nd the defendant's evidence of lack of price
impact unconvincing; and (4) any additional evidence of price
impact oered by the plainti. The court should deny certication
only if, considering all of this evidence, the court determines that
no reasonable jury could nd the element of price impact.
178
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V. This Essay's Recommended Analytical Pathway
In summary, this Essay recommends that, when analyzing the
element of price impact for purposes of class certication, courts
should apply Wal-Mart and Comcast’s “capable of” test to
determine the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate
common answers.101 In short, if a reasonable jury could nd price
impact, the court should certify the class.102 When making that
determination, the Court should apply Rule 301's guidance on
the burdens of production and persuasion with respect to a
presumption about an element of the plainti's case, as developed
in the context of a defendant's motion for summary judgment or
judgment as a matter of law.103 This Essay's recommendation can
be summarized in the following analytical pathway:
Step One: Has the plainti established the basic facts giving
rise to the presumption of price impact (i.e., public dissemination
of the alleged misrepresentation and market eciency)? If not,
the plainti has failed to show that a reasonable jury could nd
price impact, and class certication should be denied. If so, the
court should proceed to Step Two.
Step Two: Has the defendant oered any rebuttal evidence of
the non-existence of price impact? If not, the court should certify
the class because the defendant has failed to rebut the presumption of price impact and a reasonable jury could thus nd the existence of price impact. If so, the court should proceed to Step
Three.
Step Three: Based on the defendant's rebuttal evidence, could
a reasonable jury nd the non-existence of price impact? If not,
the court should certify the class because the defendant has failed
to rebut the presumption of price impact and a reasonable jury
could thus nd the existence of price impact. If so, the defendant
has rebutted the presumption of price impact, and the court
should proceed to Step Four.
Step Four: Disregarding the presumption of price impact and
examining all of the evidence, including the natural inferences
from the public dissemination of the alleged misrepresentation
into an ecient market, the defendant's evidence of lack of price
impact, any reasons to nd the defendant's evidence of lack of
price impact unconvincing, and any additional evidence of price
impact oered by the plainti, could a reasonable jury nd the
existence of price impact? If so, the court should certify the class
because it is “capable of” classwide resolution. If not, the court
should not certify the class.
VI. Comparison of this Essay's Recommendation to the
Case Law on Halliburton II
This Essay's recommendation is consistent with some courts'
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applications of Halliburton II and inconsistent with other courts'
applications. For example, the court's analysis in Local 703, I.B.
of T. Grocery & Food Employees Welfare Fund v. Regions
Financial Corp.104 is consistent with this Essay's recommendation.
In that case, the plaintis successfully invoked the presumption
of price impact.105 In rebuttal, the defendants oered an event
study that showed that a corrective disclosure had not signicantly impacted the stock price.106 Then, the defendants argued
that, because the plaintis' expert had conducted no event study
of his own, class certication must be denied.107 The court rejected
this contention, noting that “nothing in Halliburton II requires
the plaintis to produce an event study in opposition to defendants' event study on a class certication motion.”108 Then, the
court examined the defendants' expert's event study and found
various reasons that the defendants' expert's event study was
unconvincing, including that it failed to account for the dierence
between a 24% decline in the defendant company's stock price on
the date of the corrective disclosure and only a 6.11% decline on
the New York Stock Exchange on the same date.109 The court
thus concluded that price impact was “properly reserved for a
jury to decide” and certied the class.110
The Regions Financial Corp. court's ruling is consistent with
this Article's recommendation. Under this Article's recommendation, after the defendant's production of an event study that
would enable a reasonable jury to nd the absence of price impact,
the presumption of price impact disappeared, and the inquiry at
class certication became whether, based on a review of the evidence as a whole, a reasonable jury could nd price impact. A
review of all of the evidence, including that the alleged misrepresentation was publicly disseminated into an ecient market and
that there were reasons to nd the defendant's event study
unconvincing, demonstrated that a reasonable jury could nd
price impact despite the absence of an event study by the
plaintis. Therefore, under this Essay's recommendation, the
court correctly reserved this question for the jury and granted
class certication.
This Essay's recommendation is inconsistent with the Second
Circuit's pre-Wal-Mart, pre-Halliburton II case law on price
impact, which several district courts have found to survive Halliburton II.111 Under the Second Circuit's case law on price impact,
once the presumption is invoked, the class should be certied unless the defendant proves the absence of price impact by a
preponderance of the evidence.112 The Second Circuit's rule diers
from this Essay's recommendation both with respect to the
burden of production and the burden of persuasion.
With respect to the burden of production, under this Essay's
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recommendation, the defendant can rebut the presumption of
price impact by producing evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to nd an absence of price impact. This burden of production is lower than the “preponderance of the evidence” burden
of production placed on the defendant by the Second Circuit.
With respect to the burden of persuasion, under this Essay's
recommendation, once the defendant has met the burden of production, class certication should be denied only if, based on a
review of all of the evidence, no reasonable jury could nd price
impact. The Second Circuit would require a denial of class certication if the defendant showed the absence of price impact by a
mere preponderance of the evidence. The Second Circuit's standard would compel denial of class certication more often than
this Essay's recommendation because a defendant's showing of
the absence of price impact by a mere preponderance of the evidence (which would compel denial of class certication under the
Second Circuit's standard) does not mean that a reasonable jury
could not nd price impact113 (which is this Essay's standard for
denying class certication).
VII. Conclusion
In conclusion, this Essay seeks to provide guidance on one
question left unanswered by Halliburton II: the burdens of production and persuasion on price impact at class certication. This
Essay proposes a framework drawn from the Court's guidance in
Wal-Mart and Comcast on merits inquiries at class certication
and Rule 301's guidance on the burdens of production and persuasion with respect to presumptions.
This is not the only question left unanswered. For example,
Halliburton II likewise leaves open the following questions: How
can a party prove price impact or the lack thereof with respect to
alleged conrmatory misrepresentations? For an alleged nonconrmatory misrepresentation, does a drop upon disclosure of
“the truth” prove price impact, even if the statement did not
cause an initial positive impact when it was made? Conversely,
for an alleged non-conrmatory misrepresentation, does an initial
positive impact when a statement is made prove price impact,
even if there is not a drop upon disclosure of “the truth”? If a
price drop upon disclosure of the truth is sucient to show price
impact, is there still an analytical distinction between price
impact for purposes of the fraud-on-the-market presumption of
reliance and price impact for purposes of loss causation? As suggested by Justice Breyer during the Halliburton II oral argument, if the class were explicitly conned to those investors “that
bought it on the market at the same time, [and] had no information,”114 the element of price impact would operate similarly to
the element of materiality because a failure of proof at the merits
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stage would not splinter the class (rather, the defendant would
simply win);115 if a class were so dened, could price impact be
left to the merits rather than addressed at class certication?
Hopefully, this Essay will inspire other scholars to engage in a
discussion about the many questions left unanswered by Halliburton II, including the burdens of production and persuasion
on price impact at class certication.
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